Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi gestures, at the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) headquarters in New Delhi, India, June 4, 2024. REUTERS/Adnan Abidi

In recent years, the global fentanyl crisis has continued to evolve in troubling and increasingly complex ways, raising difficult and often uncomfortable questions about the geography of illicit supply chains. While much of the international debate has traditionally focused on Mexico, new data emerging between 2024 and 2025 suggests a more complicated and concerning reality. Gradually more, attention is turning to India, not merely as a peripheral player, but as a significant source of precursor chemicals and manufacturing inputs.

Between 2024 and 2025, several reported cases indicated a noticeable and hard-to-ignore rise in the volume of fentanyl precursor chemicals linked to Indian suppliers. One confirmed transaction in March 2025 reportedly involved 25 kilograms of precursor substances. Subsequent negotiations allegedly escalated to as much as 4,000 kilograms, with at least half explicitly intended for the U.S. market. These figures, taken at face value, are difficult to dismiss. Such volumes go well beyond what could reasonably be attributed to small-scale smuggling, instead pointing toward something far closer to industrial-level diversion – a possibility that raises serious concerns about oversight and accountability.

At the same time, international institutions have begun to sharpen their focus. Both the United Nations and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence have reportedly identified India as a relevant source of fentanyl precursor chemicals and tablet-pressing equipment. It does suggest that India’s role in these supply chains may be more substantial than officials would like to acknowledge.

This growing scrutiny gained further momentum when Donald Trump, in September 2025, included India on a list of major drug transit or illicit drug-producing countries. Although such designations are often shaped by political considerations, they nonetheless reflect mounting concern in Washington that fentanyl supply routes are diversifying – and that India is an increasingly important piece of that puzzle.

Of course, India’s position as one of the world’s largest pharmaceutical producers complicates any simplistic interpretation – yet it also amplifies the stakes. With pharmaceutical exports exceeding $30 billion in 2024 and projected to grow rapidly, the scale of production is enormous. That scale, however, comes with an obvious and pressing question: is regulatory oversight anywhere near strong enough to match it?

Under the leadership of Narendra Modi, India has taken steps to strengthen cooperation with the United States, including intelligence-sharing initiatives and tighter export controls. Even so, these measures clearly do not go far enough. Persistent gaps – whether due to bureaucratic inertia, fragmented authority, or outdated regulatory systems – suggest a structure that is reactive rather than robust. Such weaknesses can create precisely the kind of openings that sophisticated criminal networks are quick to exploit.

One particularly problematic dimension lies in digital space. As global trade increasingly migrates online, illicit activity has followed. Reports indicate that certain business-to-business platforms may be used – whether knowingly or through negligence – to facilitate access to chemical compounds that can be repurposed for fentanyl production. While many of these substances have legitimate uses, the apparent ease with which they can be marketed raises uncomfortable questions about enforcement, due diligence, and corporate responsibility.

At the same time, encrypted communication tools and decentralized transaction systems have made it easier than ever for transnational criminal organizations to operate across borders. In this environment, India’s rapidly expanding digital economy may not just be an asset – it may also be a vulnerability. Regulators are falling behind, and India’s role as a key source of fentanyl precursor chemicals makes that unmistakably clear.

Logistics and enforcement add yet another layer of concern. Global supply chains depend on vast and often opaque networks of shipping, customs, and documentation – systems that are well known for their susceptibility to manipulation. Practices such as mislabeling shipments, falsifying invoices, and rerouting goods through intermediary countries are not hypothetical; they are standard tactics in international trafficking. Reports suggesting that precursor chemicals linked to India may be moving through such channels inevitably raise doubts about inspection capacity and technological preparedness.

As the so-called “pharmacy to the world,” even a relatively small failure in oversight within India can translate into disproportionately large consequences on the global stage. It is important to remember that, in the international arena, responsibility has much more to do with the material, concrete fact than with the intentions behind it. The country is responsible for the products that leave its territory and must therefore act accordingly. The numbers are hard to ignore. Clearly, India knows what is happening – and is failing, or avoiding, to respond.

There is little reason to treat the fentanyl crisis in India as a matter of mere administrative weakness. The persistence of these “failures” strongly suggests, at minimum, systemic negligence – and at worst, tacit alignment between elements of the state, local economic elites, and bureaucratic networks that benefit from the status quo. This pattern raises serious concerns about institutional integrity. Such concerns will not be overlooked: trade partners (including the U.S.) are increasingly likely to subject India’s regulatory and enforcement practices to rigorous scrutiny.

In any case, New Delhi has the chance to clean up its image and prove itself a legitimate partner. It simply needs to act decisively in combating the trafficking of fentanyl precursors. Without this, Indian credibility will hardly be restored.